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1ABSTRACT
Many aeronautical decision-making (ADM) mnemonic-based methods exist.
However, there is no empirical research that suggests that they are actually
effective in improving decision-making. Klein (1993), in his study of
naturalistic decision making suggested that the decision-making process
centers around two processes; situation assessment to generate a plausible
course of action and mental simulation to evaluate that course of action for
risk management. In this study a short, ADM training course was constructed
around two mnemonic methods, SHOR (Stimuli, Hypotheses, Options, and Response)
and DESIDE (Detect, Estimate, Set safety objectives, Identify, Do, Evaluate).
Forty-one pilots from the Republic of China Tactical Training Wing
participated: half received a short ADM training course and half did not.
After training, the procedural knowledge underpinning their Situation
Assessment and Risk Management ability, two skills essential for successful
decision-making, were evaluated using pencil and paper-based knowledge tests
based upon several demanding tactical flight situations. These scenarios
were designed to encompass the six basic types of decision making described
by Orasanu (1993); go/no go decisions; recognition-primed decisions; response
selection decisions; resource management decisions; non-diagnostic
procedural decisions, and decisions requiring creative problem-solving. The
results show gains attributable to the decision making training course in
both situation assessment and risk management skills. The results strongly
suggest that ADM is trainable and such a training course is effective in
improving the bases of in-flight decision-making.
2INTRODUCTION
Aeronautical decision-making (ADM) is defined by the FAA (1991) as 'a
systematic approach to the mental process used by aircraft pilots to
consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set
of circumstances' (Hunter, 2003). Jensen (1995) defined pilot judgment as
'the mental process that pilots use in making decisions'. Both definitions
implicitly include both process and outcome. For military pilots operating
in a hostile environment, the normal hazards of aviation are compounded by
the enemy’s intent for the destruction of the aircraft. Fischer, Orasanu,
& Wich (1995) suggested that risk and time pressure are situational variables
that further constrain the decision process, as risk and time pressure may
call for an immediate response whether or not the problem was fully understood.
Minimal risk levels and fewer time constraints, in contrast, permit
additional diagnostic actions or the deliberation of options.
Klein (1993), in his study of naturalistic decision making suggested that
the decision-making process centers around two processes; situation
assessment, which is used as a precursor to generate a plausible course of
action and mental simulation to evaluate that course of action for risk
management. If a pilot recognizes there is sufficient time for making
wide-ranging considerations, s/he will evaluate the dominant response option
by conducting a mental simulation to see if it is likely to work. If there
is not adequate time, the pilot will tend to implement the course of action
that experience (if any) dictates is the most likely to be successful.
3Endsley (1997) defines situation awareness (SA) as ‘the perception of the
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the
future’. In the dynamic tactical environment, effective decision-making is
highly dependent on situation awareness which has been identified as a critical
decision component (Endsley & Bolstad, 1994). Situation assessment is the
process by which the state of situation awareness is achieved and is a
fundamental precursor to situation awareness, which is itself the precursor
for all aspects of decision-making (Nobel, 1993; Prince & Salas, 1997).
Jensen, Guilke & Tigner (1997) suggested that risk management should be a
key part of the decision-making process. Risk assessment feeds into decision
making in two ways: during the assessment of the precipitating threats and
in evaluating potential courses of action. Janis and Mann (1977) proposed
that a good decision-making process is one in which the decision maker
successfully accomplishes the collection of information about a wide range
of alternatives, carefully assesses the risks and benefits of each course
of action, and prepares contingency plans for dealing with known risks.
Tactical flight training has many aspects that challenge the quality and
processes of pilots’ in-flight decision-making. In addition to the tasks
and situations faced by the pilot of a civil aircraft, military pilots must
perform a wide range of other tasks in addition to flying their aircraft safely.
Their primary task may be to intercept offensive aircraft or to deliver
weapons, troops or equipment. Often the act of flying the aircraft per se
in a hostile environment becomes a secondary task. As a result, military
pilots must learn to make decisions related to mission performance in addition
4to those related to flying the aircraft per se (Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997). Flying
advanced fighter aircraft has made increasing demands on pilots’ cognitive
abilities as the complexity of cockpit systems and the tactical situation
has grown. There is now a requirement for decision-making training to be
incorporated into tactical training programs (Li, Harris & Yu, 2005a).
Furthermore, many accidents are either wholly or partially attributable to
poor decision-making (Li, Harris & Yu, 2005b). However, at the present time,
there is little or no formal training available for military pilots in the
ROC Air Force or elsewhere offering heuristics, procedures or advice about
making effective decisions under high pressure and in a time-limited, tactical
situation.
Many researchers have suggested that ADM is trainable (Endsley, 1993; Klein,
1993 & 1997; Orasanu, 1993; Prince & Salas, 1997; Li & Harris, 2005). Buch
and Diehl (1984) found that judgment training produced significantly better
decisions among civil aviation pilots. Connolly, Blackwell & Lester (1989)
observed that decision-making skills could be improved by the use of judgment
training materials coupled with simulator practice. However, Orasanu (1993)
suggested that generic training techniques to improve all-purpose
decision-making skills would not be successful. She suggested that different
component skills were involved when making six different basic types of
decisions (go/no go decisions; recognition-primed decisions; response
selection decisions; resource management decisions; non-diagnostic
procedural decisions; and creative problem-solving).
There are a number of strategies embodied in mnemonics or acronyms describing
the processes and procedures concerned with ADM. These have been developed
5in recent years by researchers and used by pilots to support ADM ‘best practice’
(e.g. Wohl, 1981; Maher, 1989; Klein & Woods, 1993; Hormann, 1995; Oldaker,
1996; Jensen, 1997; David, 1997; Murray, 1997; Orasanu, 1997; Jensen & Hunter,
2002; O’Hare, 2003). The common aim of these techniques is to encourage a
systematic approach to decision-making that should be less affected by the
human nature and should also reduce the cognitive work for pilots (O’Hare,
2003). However, there is a lack of hard empirical research demonstrating
the effectiveness of these ADM mnemonic methods.
Li & Harris (2005) undertook a study to identify the best ADM mnemonic-based
methods for training military pilot’s decision-making. From the results of
this study it was found that SHOR (Wohl, 1981) was rated as being the best
ADM mnemonic in time-limited and critical, urgent situations. DESIDE (Murray,
1997) was regarded as superior for knowledge-based decisions which required
more comprehensive considerations but also had more time available to do so.
The SHOR mnemonic (Wohl, 1981) consists of four steps: Stimuli, Hypotheses,
Options, and Response. It was originally developed for use by U.S. Air Force
tactical command and control, where decisions were required under high
pressure and severe time constraint. In this situation, decisions require
near-real-time reactions involving threat warning, rescheduling and other
types of dynamic modification. The SHOR methodology is basically an extension
of the stimulus-response paradigm of classical behavioral psychology
developed to deal with two aspects of uncertainty in the decision-making
process, information input uncertainty (which requires hypothesis generation
and evaluation) followed by the evaluation of the consequences of actions,
which creates the requirement for option generation and evaluation. DESIDE
(Murray, 1997) was developed on a sample of South African pilots and comprises
6six steps, Detect, Estimate, Set safety objectives, Identify, Do, Evaluate.
The DESIDE method is a practical application to aid pilots in making in-flight
decisions adapted from the conflict-theory model of Janis and Mann (1977).
O'Connor, Flin, Fletcher & Hemsley (2002) described several methods for the
evaluation of CRM (Crew Resource Management) and ADM training, including
the use of simulator/LOFT checks; self/peer/360 degree appraisals; the
assessment of technical performance; the analysis of confidential reports
and the use of knowledge assessment tests. The standard method for the
assessment of the knowledge-based elements is normally a pencil and paper
based test. This provides a reasonably quick and simple way of evaluating
knowledge acquisition. The following study evaluates the effectiveness of
a short ADM training course delivered to ROC Air Force cadet pilots based
around the SHOR and DESIDE ADM mnemonic-based methods using a pencil-and –paper
knowledge based approach. The ADM training course (described in more detail
in the following section) also provided advice concerning which ADM approach
was most suitable in any given situation. It is argued that the decision
making training program delivered requires assessment in two aspects: the
actual decision-making performance of students on completion of the training
and an assessment of the process by which they arrive at their decision. In
this paper emphasis is placed on the evaluation of the pilots’ decision-making
process and the quality of the decision based around the dimensions of
situation assessment and risk management. The results of the product-based
measures of the training program, evaluated using decision scenarios
re-created in a full-flight simulator are reported elsewhere (Li, Harris &
Yu, 2005b; Li & Harris, under review a; Li and Harris, under review b). While
these simulator trials could assess the products of the ADM training program
7in a time-pressured, real-time environment they had severe limitations in
establishing if the processes taught within the training course were being
applied appropriately, hence the requirement for the knowledge-based pencil
and paper tests.
Furthermore, when evaluating decision-making efficacy, Baron and Hershey
(1988) suggested that the study of ‘outcomes’ shows a tendency of people to
assess the correctness of their decision-making with regard to the outcome
of the decision. However, good decisions can lead to bad outcomes (and vice
versa) especially when operating in a probabilistic environment, such as
aviation. Decision makers cannot infallibly be graded by their results (Brown,
Kahr, & Peterson, 1974). A good decision cannot guarantee a good outcome.
All in-flight decisions are made under uncertainty. Evaluating a decision
as good (or not) must depend as much on the stakes and the processes employed,
not just simply on the outcome. Hence, in this study the evaluation of the
effectiveness of decision-making training is based around the decision-making
adjuncts of situation assessment and risk management measures rather than
simply on assessing the outcomes of the decisions made.
Using Kirkpatrick's (1976, 1998) hierarchy for training evaluation, the
current study assesses the product of the training interventions at the second
level of evaluation (learning). The pencil-and-paper based evaluation of
the ADM training program delivered is specifically concerned with establishing
if the participants have acquired the decision-making procedural knowledge
as a result of attending the training course. It was hypothesized that the
provision of ADM training would produce superior situation assessment and
risk management performance (two key factors underpinning effective decision
8making) in a range of in-flight decision-making scenarios encompassing
Orasanu’s (1993) six decision-making categories.
METHOD
Participants
Forty-One male participants from ROC Air Force Tactical Training Wings
participated in the study. The flying experience of participants was between
220 and 354 hours with an average of 292 hours. Participants were randomly
divided into two groups, 21 pilots in the experimental (trained) group and
20 pilots in the control (untrained) group.
The Contents of ADM Training Programs
The results from a previous study by Li and Harris (2005) found that just
two mnemonic-based methods provided a suitable basis for all aspects of ADM
training. These methods encompassed all the requirements of the six basic
decision making situations. SHOR (Wohl, 1981) was regarded as being the best
for time-limited and urgent situations; DESIDE (Murray, 1997) was regarded
as being superior for guiding knowledge-based decisions needing more
comprehensive consideration. These two mnemonic methods formed the basis
of the ADM training programs. The objective of the training course was to
equip trainees with the procedural knowledge required to use these methods.
9The training program commenced with an introduction to ADM theories, including
the Recognition-Primed Decision Model of Rapid Decision Making (Klein, 1993);
The ARTFUL Decision Maker: A Framework Model for Aeronautical Decision Making
(O’Hare, 1992); Conflict-theory Decision Making Model (Janis & Mann, 1977);
a Model of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Decision-making (Endsley, 1997);
and the Decision Process Model (Orasanu, 1995). This was followed by a
description of the content and method of application of the SHOR and DESIDE
ADM mnemonic-based methods. To optimize decision making training
effectiveness it was also necessary to instruct pilots with regard to which
technique was the most appropriate to apply in any given circumstance.
Following this, participants underwent a period of supervised practice in
the classroom in the application of SHOR and DESIDE in flight situations
exemplifying the six basic types of decision making scenario described by
Orasanu (1993). Finally, the application of ADM in military aviation was
described and the participants who participated in the training course were
de-briefed. The ADM training program lasted approximately four hours in total.
Scenarios for the Assessment of ADM Training Effectiveness
To develop scenarios for assessing the effectiveness of the ADM training
intervention which corresponded to Orasanu’s (1993) six decision making
categories, six focus groups were conducted, one for each scenario. Each
focus group comprised one human factors specialist and three senior instructor
pilots. The purpose of these focus groups was to verify that the scenarios
used in the pre-training and post-training evaluation of decision-making
(which were developed from the ROCAF accidents and incidents database)
corresponded to the appropriate categories of decision-making and were of
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equivalent difficulty. Further details of the process validating the
selection of the scenarios for each generic decision type can be found in
Li & Harris (2005).
To negate practice effects, different (but equivalent) scenarios were used
in the evaluations pre- and post ADM training. These focus groups also ensured
enough detail was available for pilots to be able to make a decision and hence
to evaluate their decision-making performance. These scenarios developed were
as follows.
Go/no go decision-making scenario
Go/no go decisions are made under severe time pressure and involve considerable
risk; the amount of thinking should be minimal. Orasanu (1993) suggests that
training design should focus on developing perceptual patterns in memory that
constitute the conditions for the required action. However, they should be
trained under realistic time pressure and the training scenarios should
include additional contingencies that require more complex risk assessment.
Pre-training scenario: F-5E No. 2 wingman has to make a decision as the
No. 1 (Leader) abandons a tactical formation take-off at 145 knots.
Post-training scenario: F-5E No. 2 wingman practicing tactical formation
training; during the take off run with the throttles increased
to maximum, No.1 (leader) suddenly slants seriously towards the
No.2.
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In both the above scenarios the pilots had to make a decision under time
pressure with high risk. The patterns of events needed to be recognized and
pre-set responses needed to be executed swiftly. The cognitive activities
required of the pilots were essentially perceptual and interpretive.
Recognition-primed decision-making scenario
Recognition-primed decisions are described by Orasanu (1993) as the
recognition of the situational patterns that serve as inputs to
condition-action rules, but which also require the decision maker to learn
the response side of the rule and its link to that condition.
Pre-training scenario: F-5E right engine fails as a result of Foreign Object
Damage just as the nose gear leaves the ground at a speed of 165
knots.
Post-training scenario: F-5E solo, after taking off at 500 feet, pilot
hears two unusual sounds from the engines and feels the aircraft
shake. Engine exhaust gas temperature is increased, and RPM
decreased.
As noted earlier in the Introduction, Klein (1993) suggested that
recognition-primed decisions focuses on the two processes of situation
assessment and mental simulation. If there is no time to make a considered
response (as in the case of both the above scenarios) the pilot will implement
the rule that experience has determined will be the most likely to be
successful. These situations require more conscious cognitive processing
than go/no go decisions (cf Reason’s rule-based errors; Reason 1990).
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Response selection decision-making scenario
Response selection decisions involve a single option that must be selected
from a set of possible options; pilots must identify the possible options
and evaluate them in terms of how well they satisfy the goals and meet
constraints. Often they must consider trade-offs among competing goals which
are satisfied by different options.
Pre-training scenario: No. 4 wingman in a tactical formation of F-5Es is
required to make a decision when No. 1 (Leader) becomes lost in
cloud during formation flight (3 feet distance between wing tips
of the four fighters).
Post-training scenario: F-5E leader was maintaining loose formation with
No. 2 on the left, at 13,000 feet, the Ground Intercept Controller
reports an unidentified aircraft at one o’clock and 5 miles away.
At the same time No.2 makes visual contact with an airliner in
front and head-on at 3 miles away with same altitude and approaching
fast (leader had no orders).
In both scenarios the wingman has to make a decision to choose a response
to deal with an impending hazard. Although these are not urgent situations,
pilots may perceive the potential risk in front of them to be very high and
choose an inappropriate course of action. However, once the nature of the
potential threat is identified there are detailed procedures available from
their training of how to deal with the situation.
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Resource management decision-making scenario
Resource management decisions involve the relative priorities of various
tasks, especially critical ones. Skills relevant to this type of decision
include estimation of the time required to complete the various tasks,
knowledge of the interdependencies among tasks, and scheduling strategies.
Pre-training scenario: F-5E leader of 4 aircraft needs to make a decision
for the No.3 and No. 4 aircraft when a ‘no joy’ call (no visual
contact with No. 1 and No. 2) is made and No. 2 calls ‘one opposing
target approaching on 12:30 o’clock with same altitude’. This
occurs during practice of a 2 versus 2 Air Combat Maneuver
engagement.
Post-training scenario: Leader and No.2 are practicing basic fighting
maneuvers for a gunshot attack; the distance between No. 2 and
the leader is only 500 feet, the angle off is over 90 degrees.
The possibility of a mid-air collision is high; both aircraft are
at 480 knots and same altitude.
Perhaps the most critical issues for resource management decisions are setting
the priorities of the responses required to make and implement a decision.
In the scenarios described above the resource allocation problem changes
from one of practicing basic fighting maneuvers to one of avoiding a collision.
There are certain actions that must be completed within a few seconds to
avoid a mid-air crash and they must be prioritized and undertaken in a certain
order, such as calling out to alert other traffic prior to climbing or
descending or changing direction.
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Non-diagnostic procedural decision-making scenario
Non-diagnostic procedural decisions involve a number of cues falling into
a category with no prescribed response. The nature of the problem is unclear
and many different types of ambiguous cues may also signal potentially
dangerous conditions. Orasanu (1993) suggests that training for this type
of decision should involve mainly situation assessment and risk assessment.
Cues that signal possible emergencies need to be distinguished from those
that are troublesome but not severe enough to precipitate an emergency landing.
Pre-training scenario: Both the leader and wingman in a formation of F-5Es
are unable to land at home-base in a ‘bingo’ (low fuel) situation
during instrument flight in bad weather.
Post-training scenario: When an F-5E is finishing Basic Fighting Maneuver
training, the Ground Intercept Controller reports that home base
weather is worsening. Surplus fuel is down to only 1,400 lb. The
pilot asks for weather conditions at alternative airports.
In both the pre-test and post-test scenarios pilots had to evaluate the
strengths and weakness of using alternative airfields in deteriorating weather
in a ‘bingo fuel’ situation. There was no clearly defined ‘correct’ answer.
Although the nature of the immediate problem is clear (deteriorating weather
at home base) the problems imposed by diverting to an alternate airfield are
unclear and deviations from the optimal solution may be required due to the
low fuel state.
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Creative problem-solving decision-making scenario
Creative problem-solving decisions are the most complex, as they involve both
diagnoses to determine the nature of the situation and response generation.
Pilots must determine what their goals are, develop a plan and candidate
strategies, and evaluate these strategies and actions based on projections
of likely outcomes (Orasanu, 1993).
Pre-training scenario: When flying an F-5F both left and right generators
warning lights become active during a tactical maneuver.
Post-training scenario: When lowering the landing gear while on the
down-wind leg the landing gear shaft warning light illuminates,
indicating the nose landing gear is abnormal.
In both the decision-making scenarios presented, once the true nature of the
problem has been determined (from the indications in the cockpit the pilot
was only initially aware of the symptoms of the problem in both cases, not
their ultimate cause) they would determine that there were no recommendations
in the SOPs/manuals for its resolution, hence a novel solution had to be
developed to address the situation.
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Procedure
Both experimental (trained) and control (untrained) groups undertook an
initial set of pencil and paper based evaluations where they were required
to describe how they would deal with each of the problems described in above
pre-training decision making scenarios. These evaluations were simply in
the form of narrative-based reports describing the steps that they would take
when assessing their options and coming to a decision. After these initial
tests the experimental group attended a four-hour ‘ADM training Program for
military pilots’. The Control group had no such training. Both groups then
participated in a further set of pencil and paper evaluations.
To eliminate order effects, the six decision making scenarios were presented
in a randomized order in both the pre- and post-training trials. The narrative
responses describing the process by which the participants would arrive at
their decision were evaluated by a flight instructor with regard to their
situation assessment and risk management performance. These dimensions were
derived from the earlier study (Li and Harris, 2005) used to select the most
appropriate ADM training mnemonic methods. Each aspect of performance was
rated using a nine-point Likert-type scale (with a high score of 9 and a low
score of 1).
To enhance the reliability of the measures, the same instructor evaluated
trainee performance on all occasions. The instructor was trained by an
aviation human factors specialist to evaluate performance in the required
manner. The narratives describing the decision making process were anonymized
before being passed to the flight instructor, thus he was blind to the
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experimental condition. Furthermore, the instructor took no part in
delivering any aspect of the aeronautical decision making training course.
For the evaluation of both Situation Assessment and Risk Management
performance in the narrative answers produced, a list of key performance
factors (taken from the training manuals) was derived for each scenario.
The steps that should be undertaken and sources of information that should
be interrogated in each circumstance were listed, these being factors
underlying Situation Assessment performance in particular. Emphasis on the
risk management dimension was placed upon the generation and analysis of
options and the quality of reasoning underlying the pilot’s final decision
based specifically on the control of risk.
Ethical Approval
This research program was approved by the Ethics committee of Cranfield
University. This committee operates to the principles prescribed by the
British Psychological Society (the UK professional body for psychologists).
Participants were volunteers and informed of the purpose of the study prior
to participating. All data were collected anonymously.
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RESULTS
Data
The ADM decision making process that each participant employed was evaluated
in all six scenarios in both pre- and post ADM training. In total 492 narrative
responses were collected, 246 prior to ADM training taking place and the same
number after the training course had been delivered. Two hundred and fifty-two
trials were undertaken by the experimental group and 240 by the control group.
To re-iterate, the ADM processes described in the narratives produced by
the cadet pilots were rated on the dimensions of situation assessment and
risk management.
Go/no go Decisions
Irrespective of experimental group, there was no overall difference in
situation assessment performance between the pre- and post-test (F1,39=1.214;
p=0.277). There was an effect approaching significance between the trained
and untrained group (F1,39=3.277; p=0.078). The group that had received ADM
training tended to outperform the group that had not received training (table
1). The interaction term between the trained/untrained group and pre-
post-training was significant (F1,39=4.355; p=0.043). The group that had
received ADM training showed significantly greater gains in the second trial
compared to the untrained group. Overall, there was no difference on risk
management performance between the pre- and post-test (F1,39=0.448; p=0.507).
There was also no significant difference between the trained and untrained
group (F1,39=2.207; p=0.145). However, there was an effect verging on
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significance with regard to the interaction term between the trained/untrained
group and pre- post-training trial (F1,39=3.266; p=0.078). The group that
had received ADM training showed somewhat greater gains in risk management
performance during the second trial compared to the untrained group.
---------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
---------------------------------------------
Recognition-Primed Decisions
There was no difference in situation assessment performance between the pre-
and post-test (F1,39=0.927; p=0.342). There was also no significant difference
between the trained and untrained group (F1,39=1.337; p=0.225). However, there
was a significant interaction effect between the trained/untrained group and
pre- and post- ADM training trial (F1,39=9.555; p=0.004). The group that had
received ADM training showed significantly greater gains in performance in
the second trial compared to the untrained group (table 2). There was no
significant difference in risk management performance between the pre- and
post-test (F1,39=0.141; p=0.710). There was, however, an effect approaching
statistical significance with regard to pilots’ performance between the
trained and untrained group (F1,39=2.900; p=0.097). The group that had received
ADM training tended to perform better than the group that had not received
training. There was also an interaction term verging on significance
(F1,39=3.266; p=0.078). The group that received ADM training showed greater
gains in performance in the second trial compared to the untrained group.
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---------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
---------------------------------------------
Response Selection Decisions
There was an effect approaching statistical significance with regard to pilot
performance between the pre- and post-test on the dimension of situation
assessment (F1,39=3.520; p=0.068). This suggested that pilots’ situation
assessment was rated as having improved on the second trial regardless of
whether they received training or not (see table 3). There was also an effect
verging on statistical significance between the trained and untrained group
(F1,39=3.277; p=0.078). The group that had received ADM training tended to
outperform the group that had not received training. There was no significant
interaction effect (F1,39=1.461; p=0.234). There was no significant difference
on risk management performance between the pre- and post-test (F1,39=2.0641;
p=0.112). There was a result approaching statistical significance on risk
management performance between the trained and untrained group (F1,39=4.022;
p=0.052). The group that had received ADM training tended to exhibit better
performance than the group that had not received training. There was also
a significant interaction term between the trained/untrained group and
pre-test post-test trial (F1,39=5.591; p=0.023). The group that had received
ADM training showed greater gains in risk management performance in the second
trial compared to the untrained group.
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---------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
---------------------------------------------
Resource Management Decisions
There was a significant difference in pilots’ situation assessment performance
between the pre- and post-test (F1,39=4.914; p=0.033). Pilots’ performance
was superior on the second trial (table 4). There was, however, no significance
between the trained and untrained group (F1,39=1.767; p=0.191) and there was
also no significant interaction (F1,39=1.238; p=0.273). Overall, there was
an effect verging on significance in risk management performance between the
pre- and post-test measures (F1,39=3.035; p=0.089). Pilots’ risk management
performance was superior on the second trial. There was no significant
difference between the trained and untrained group (F1,39=0.052; p=0.820)
and there was no significant interaction term (F1,39=2.247; p=0.142).
---------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
---------------------------------------------
Non-diagnostic Procedural Decisions
Overall, there was no difference in situation assessment performance between
the pre- and post-test (F1,39=1.007; p=0.322). There was an effect verging
on significance in performance between the trained and untrained group
(F1,39=3.593; p=0.065). The group that had received ADM training tended to
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outperform the group that had not received training (table 5). There was
also a significant interaction term between the trained/untrained group and
pre-test/post-test trial (F1,39=19.540; p=0.000). The group that had received
ADM training showed significantly greater gains in situation assessment
performance in the second trial. There was no significant difference in risk
management performance between the pre- and post-test (F1,39=0.067; p=0.797).
There was also no significant difference between the trained and untrained
group (F1,39=1.887; p=0.177). There was a result verging on significance in
the interaction term between the trained/untrained group and
pre-test/post-test trial (F1,39=3.266; p=0.078). The group that had received
ADM training showed greater gains in performance in the second trial compared
to the untrained group.
---------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
---------------------------------------------
Creative problem-solving
There was a significant difference in situation assessment performance between
the pre- and post-test measures (F1,39=10.320; p=0.003). It showed that pilots’
performance was better on the second trial than the first trial (table 6).
There was no significance between the trained and untrained group (F1,39=0.187;
p=0.668) and there was also no significant interaction term (F1,39=2.393;
p=0.130). There was a significant difference on the dimension of risk
management (F1,39=5.885; p=0.020). It indicated the pilots’ performance on
risk management was superior on the second trial. There was no significant
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difference between the trained and untrained group (F1,39=0.162; p=0.690).
There was also no significant interaction term between the trained/untrained
group and trial (F1,39=2.509; p=0.121).
---------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
---------------------------------------------
DISCUSSION
Overall, the results show gains being made in terms of both the participants’
situation assessment and risk management skills that are attributable to the
short decision making training course. Perhaps the most direct indication
of the efficacy of the ADM training course lies in the significant interaction
effects obtained. These interaction terms indicate disproportionate gains
in performance on the second trials (post ADM training) in the participant
group that received ADM instruction. To summarize, significant results (or
results approaching significance) were obtained showing improvements in
participant’s performance in the scenarios concerned with go/no go decisions;
recognition-primed decisions, and non-diagnostic procedural decisions. With
regard to risk management, significant results (or results verging on
significance) were observed in the go/no go decision making scenario;
recognition-primed decision making scenario; response selection, and
non-diagnostic procedural decision making scenario. These results are
summarized in table 7.
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Even though every effort was made to ensure that the pre- and post-training
decision making scenarios were of equivalent difficulty, inspection of the
results from the untrained group would suggest that in several cases the
post-test scenarios were actually slightly more difficult (see tables 1, 2
and 5). Nevertheless, in spite of this evidence that would suggest that these
post- training scenarios were more difficult, the trained group still
generally showed improvements in situation assessment and risk management
performance (see the associated interaction terms). In all cases the
performance of the group that received the ADM training course improved.
---------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
---------------------------------------------
For the evaluation of both Situation Assessment and Risk Management
performance in the narrative answers produced, a. The steps that should be
undertaken and sources of information that should be interrogated in each
circumstance were listed, these being factors underlying Situation Assessment
performance in particular. Emphasis on the risk management dimension was
placed upon the generation and analysis of options and the quality of reasoning
underlying the pilot’s final decision based specifically on the control of
risk.
The results obtained add support to the findings of earlier research (e.g.
Buch and Diehl, 1984; Connolly, Blackwell & Lester, 1989; Endsley, 1993; Klein,
1993 &1997; Orasanu, 1993; Prince & Salas, 1997) that suggested that ADM was
trainable. Orasanu (1993) advocated there was no evidence that generic
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training techniques to improve decision making skills would be effective as
different component skills were involved when making different basic types
of decisions. As a result of this Li & Harris (2005) elicited the opinions
of a large sample of instructor pilots concerning the best ADM mnemonic-based
methods for use in a variety of different types of flight situations. SHOR
(Wohl, 1981) was identified as potentially the best ADM mnemonic in a
time-limited situation; DESIDE (Murray, 1997) was rated as being superior
for more complex, knowledge-based decisions where more time was available.
The results obtained in this study support the conclusions of the earlier
opinion survey. These decision making mnemonic-based methods promote better
ADM. There is now empirical evidence demonstrating that pilots trained in
the use of these techniques actually produce superior performance on two of
the essential components underlying ADM for at least some varieties of decision
making problems.
The data in the narrative reports produced by the participants in each decision
making scenario suggested that the majority of pilots who had received ADM
training applied the most appropriate ADM mnemonic method for a given
situation. The SHOR mnemonic tended to be applied in the go/no-go decision
making scenario, recognition-primed decision-making scenario and in the
response selection decision-making situation. DESIDE was most commonly used
in the remaining scenarios (resource management decisions, non-diagnostic
procedural decisions and creative problem-solving).
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CONCLUSIONS
This research investigated the efficacy of a short ADM training course using
two mnemonic-based methods (SHOR and DESIDE) to improve ROC Air Force pilot
decision-making in six different basic types of decision-making scenarios.
The results from simple paper-and-pencil based evaluations assessing the
knowledge acquired show that such a short training course is generally
effective in improving pilots’ situation assessment and risk management skill
(two underpinning requirements for effective decision-making) in a range of
decision-making situations. Complementary research undertaken in a flight
simulator has also shown behavioral gains in decision making by those who
underwent the training course (Li & Harris, 2006; Li & Harris, under review
a; Li and Harris, under review b). These complimentary behavioral gains
further establish the validity of the use of pencil and paper based tests
to evaluate the ADM training course. They provide convergent evidence to
support the efficacy of the decision making training program. However, the
longer-term effectiveness of such courses needs evaluation to see if it
translates into improved decision-making behavior during day-to-day
operations which, ultimately also results in a reduction in the accident rate
attributable to poor decision-making. By necessity, the initial evaluations
of the training program focused upon ‘problem’ situations where pilots were
required to make a satisfactory decision to avoid a potential accident.
Further research is required to establish if the ADM principles conveyed in
the training course are equally as successful in lower workload, less pressured
decision making situations. Nevertheless, this simple, short, cost-effective
training program in the appropriate use of ADM mnemonic methods can potentially
produce significant gains in flight safety. Such a course may easily be
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integrated into the existing CRM and/or simulator-based training programs
currently undertaken by cadet pilots in the ROC Air Force. Furthermore, there
is no reason why a modified version of the ADM training course devised should
not be equally as successful in a civil aviation training organization.
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Table 1
Table 1 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the Go/no go
decision-making scenario, broken down by both main effects
(pre-test/post-test: trained/untrained) on the measures of situation
awareness and risk management
Go/no go decisions
Group N Mean Standard
deviation
Trained 21 5.38 1.20
Pre-test Untrained 20 5.25 1.74
Trained 21 6.19 0.98
Situation
assessment
Post-test Untrained 20 5.00 1.65
Trained 21 5.57 1.08
Pre-test Untrained 20 5.30 1.53
Trained 21 5.95 1.07
Risk
management
Post-test Untrained 20 5.05 1.23
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Table 2
Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the
Recognition-primed decisions scenario, broken down by both main
effects (pre-test/post-test: trained/untrained) on the measures
of situation awareness and risk management
Recognition-primed
decisions Group N Mean
Standard
deviation
Trained 21 5.43 1.12
Pre-test Untrained 20 5.55 1.23
Trained 21 6.10 0.94
Situation
assessment
Post-test Untrained 20 5.20 1.44
Trained 21 5.29 1.19
Pre-test Untrained 20 5.30 1.13
Trained 21 5.86 0.73
Risk
management
Post-test Untrained 20 4.95 1.19
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Table 3
Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the
response selection decisions scenario, broken down by both main
effects (pre-test/post-test: trained/untrained) on the measures
of situation awareness and risk management.
Response selection
decisions Group N Mean
Standard
deviation
Trained 21 5.14 1.46
Pre-test Untrained 20 4.75 1.55
Trained 21 5.90 0.99
Situation
assessment
Post-test Untrained 20 4.90 1.78
Trained 21 4.86 1.01
Pre-test Untrained 20 4.85 0.99
Trained 21 5.67 0.86
Risk
management
Post-test Untrained 20 4.70 1.17
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Table 4
Table 4 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the
resource management decision scenario, broken down by both main
effects (pre-test/post-test: trained/untrained) on the measures
of situation awareness and risk management.
Resource management
decisions Group N Mean
Standard
deviation
Trained 21 4.95 1.56
Pre-test Untrained 20 4.80 1.32
Trained 21 5.86 1.15
Situation
assessment
Post-test Untrained 20 5.10 1.51
Trained 21 4.71 1.19
Pre-test Untrained 20 4.95 1.00
Trained 21 5.38 1.07
Risk
management
Post-test Untrained 20 5.00 1.52
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Table 5
Table 5 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the
non-diagnostic procedural decision-making scenario, broken down
by both main effects (pre-test/post-test: trained/untrained) on
the measures of situation awareness and risk management.
Non-diagnostic
procedural decisions Group N Mean
Standard
deviation
Trained 21 5.00 1.30
Pre-test
Untrained 20 5.30 1.22
Trained 21 6.19 1.12
Situation
assessment
Post-test
Untrained 20 4.55 1.64
Trained 21 4.95 1.16
Pre-test
Untrained 20 5.25 1.07
Trained 21 5.71 0.96
Risk
management
Post-test
Untrained 20 4.60 1.47
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Table 6
Table 6 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the
Creative problem-solving scenario, broken down by both main
effects (pre-test/post-test: trained/untrained) on the measures
of situation awareness and risk management
Creative
problem-solving Group N Mean
Standard
deviation
Trained 21 4.71 1.35
Pre-test Untrained 20 4.90 1.48
Trained 21 5.71 1.01
Situation
assessment
Post-test Untrained 20 5.25 1.02
Trained 21 4.71 1.35
Pre-test Untrained 20 4.95 1.76
Trained 21 5.67 0.97
Risk
management
Post-test Untrained 20 5.15 1.23
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Table 7
Table 7 The summary of main effects and interaction effects of paper-pencil
trials on both dimensions of situation assessment and risk
management across six basic types of decision-making scenarios
Note:  indicates a result approaching significance (p<0.10);
 Indicates a significant result (p<0.05);
SA = Situation Assessment; RM= Risk Management.
Six basic types of
decision-making
Dimensions
of
evaluation
Main effect
of
before/after
training
Main effect
of
trained/untrained
Interaction
effects
SA  
Go/no go
decisions RM 
SA Recognition-
primed decisions
RM  
SA  
Response
selection
decisions
RM  
SA Resource
management
decisions RM 
SA  Non-diagnostic
procedural
decisions RM 
SA Creative
problem-solving
RM 
